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SURFACE WATER FLOODING IN URBAN AREAS:
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER THE
COMMON-ENEMY DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION
Urban flooding is an ever increasing problem as land development
intensifies in expanding metropolitan areas. This situation not only has
a significant impact on the physical environment, but has substantial
legal consequences as well. In urban flooding situations, rivers and
streams pose obvious flood threats, but the damaged area is generally
restricted to a definable flood plain.1 Surface water presents a more
subtle and pervasive problem; with heavy rainfall or poor drainage, sur-
face runoff can submerge land not ordinarily considered subject to
flood damage, further increasing riparian problems as the concentrated
runoff finds its way to streams and rivers. 2  Although flood control
measures may be instituted to reduce some of the problems,8 occasional
1. A flood plain is the "portion of a river valley, adjacent to the river channel,
which is built of sediments during the present regimen of the stream and which is cov-
ered with water when the river overflows its banks at flood stages". AM. GEOLOGICAL
INsTITUTE, DICTIONARY OF GEOLOGICAL TERMS 166 (rev. ed. 1976). The area is usually
defined by geographic ridges, but they become less useful as indicators of the flood do-
main after urbanization because of the increased runoff from the developed land. See
note 4 infra.
This comment is limited to surface water flood problems, but the United States
Water Resources Council offers an excellent inexpensive paperback reference set. REG-
ULAION OF FLOOD HAZARD AREAs TO REDUCE FLOOD LOSSES, 2 vols. (Stock No. 5245-
0010) is available by mail for $4.50 from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Dealing with land and water regula-
tion, it covers both surface water and riparian flood problems.
2. The legal definition of surface water is "that [water] which is accumulated on
land from rain, springs, or snow, and is diffused over the surface of the ground, while
it remains in such a diffused state or condition". 78 AM. JuR. 2d Waters § 117 (1975).
Surface water may also be that which has escaped from a natural watercourse, as in a
flood, and flows in a "vagrant or casual character, following no definite course." Id.
However, legal concepts in this area clash with scientific definitions. Hydrologists gen-
erally refer to the waters discussed herein as diffused surface waters or overland flow.
See generally 4 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § 3 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as CLARK].
3. Several measures can be taken to minimize urban flooding. Zoning should in-
clude geological criteria and municipal planning should precede urban growth. See
Landman, Hicks, and Ihloff, Flood Control in Oklahoma: An Example of Land Use
Preceding Land Use Planning, 29 OKLA. L. REv. 16 (1976) [hereinafter referred to
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flooding must be anticipated as a natural result of urbanization. Just
as our ancestors accepted floods as the price of living close to a river,
urban dwellers must accept some surface water excess as one of the
inconveniences of metropolitan living.4
Some urban flood problems, however, are unnecessary. Urban
dwellers need not stoically accept the damage and inconvenience
as Flood Control in Oklahoma]. Municipal errors should be corrected. Where once
effective storm drains are now insufficient because of surrounding development, they
should be replaced with adequate facilities. Real estate developers should be required
to file an environmental impact statement to insure adequate study of the consequences
of their proposals and to provide data for the city to consider in approving the develop-
ment. Most importantly, the individual needs to be aware of nature's interaction with
man's development. Just as the person who lives near the river must learn to accept
some flooding, those who pave the drainage slopes must accept surface floods.
4. Ironically, though builders and planners attempt to provide a solution, urbaniza-
tion is itself the problem. Urban development usually includes a series of culverts and
storm sewers to provide for more efficient drainage. But there is more water to be
drained following urbanization because water that formerly fell on permeable soil now
falls on streets, parking lots, roofs, and other paved areas. See D. Flasch, Effects of
Urbanization on Peak Discharge: A Case Study, (1972) (unpublished manuscript,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Tulsa District). Another cause of increased rainfall in
urban areas is termed the "urban thermal island" theory, which notes that the heat gen-
erated by paved urban surfaces triggers precipitation in overhead air masses. See Scrubr-
Therc Am., Aug. 1967, at 15.
Thus, urban development provides not only a problem-more water-but a solution
as well-better drainage. Where rainfall exceeds drainage capacity, the water will col-
lect and bypass normal drainage channels. If an area is overdeveloped or underdrained,
even a nominal rainfall will cause flooding. Other problems arise when development
changes the grade or elevation of the land, altering the natural flow of water, and pos-
sibly diverting it into areas with insufficient drainage. Surface water problems can
manifest themselves in small areas, as between urban neighbors, or may encompass en-
tire drainage areas as urban space requirements increase. Drainage area is used here
to denote what many incorrectly call a "watershed". See H. FOWLER, MODERN ENGLiSH
USAGE 688 (2d ed. E. Gowers 1965).
5. For example, in Tulsa, Oklahoma, the area along Charles Page Boulevard be-
tween Newblock Park and 41st West Avenue presents an example of the damage and
inconvenience homeowners face from insufficient drainage systems. The neighborhood
is drained by the Parkview drainage ditch, running from 41st West Avenue through
Newblock Park, emptying into the Arkansas River. It was dug in the 1920's to collect
local surface water runoff and drain the streams from the nearby Osage hills. The area
was only sparsely developed at the time, but is now 95% urbanized according to the
1974 Land Activity File, Tulsa Metropolitan Area Planning Commission. With several
storm sewers now adding to the ditch's responsibility for discharge, a nominal rainfall
causes flooding in the area around 33rd West Avenue. The water has not yet flooded
the interior of any homes, but it has undermined the foundations, rusted floor furnaces,
and ruined gardens.
To combat these developments, a local homeowners association has submitted a
proposal to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which is currently doing a five county
drainage study for the Indian Nations Council of Governments, an area planning com-
mission. The proposal calls for a new drainage system utilizing the embankments of
an existing expressway to build collector systems that would empty into the river at vari-
ous points, relieving Parkview ditch of its excess water and area residents of their prob-
lems. Interview with Mrs. Fred Loving, member, West of Main Improvement Associa-
tion, Inc., of Tulsa, in Tulsa, Oklahoma (April 4, 1977).
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:574
caused by developers and private landowners who disregard the safety
and well-being of adjoining property and residents. In addition to
municipal ordinances through which a city may enforce grading and
drainage standards,' the victim may take direct legal action against the
offending landowner or developer.
This comment will examine various common law remedies avail-
able to resolve surface water drainage problems as exemplified in three
6. Proposed stormwater drainage criteria for the City of Tulsa state, in pertinent
part:
5. The easement for an unimproved drainageway left in a natural state
shall be. . . that width required to pass a 100-year frequency rainstorm under
full urbanization...
7. The trunk storm water drainageway system shall be designed to pass
the runoff from a 100-year frequency rainstorm under full urbanization. The
entire flow shall be confined within the said stormwater drainageway system.
12. The discharge velocity of a storm water drainageway system con-
structed for the development of a tract of land will not be greater than the
velocity that existed in the drainageway at that point under natural conditions,
nor will the velocity of the discharging water exceed the erodible limit of the
soil in place at the point of discharge....
13. Detention facilities will be required for all RS developments of 10
acres or more. Detention facilities will also be required for all other develop-
ments of 2 acres or more. This requirement is not applicable on any tract that
has 100-year full urbanization drainageway capacity from the development to
either the Arkansas River or Bird Creek.
14. The requirements for the storage and controlled release of storm
water runoff shall be as follows:
The peak release rate of storm water runoff from the development shall
not exceed the peak storm water runoff rate from the area in its natural,
undeveloped state for all rainstorm intensities up to and including the 100-
year frequency for all durations of rainfall.
The required volume for stormwater detention shall be calculated on the
basis of the runoff from a 100-year frequency rainstorm. The detention
volume required shall be that necessary to handle the runoff from a 100-
year frequency rainstorm to fully urbanized conditions, for any and all
durations, less that volume discharged during the same duration at the re-
lease rate as specified above.
City of Tulsa, Oklahoma, Storm Sewer and Storm Water Runoff and Detention Criteria
(Mar. 19, 1976).
As of March 19, 1976, these criteria must be incorporated in subdivision plots filed
with the City of Tulsa; however, the City has only administrative power, rather than
police power authority, to enforce the standards. Civil actions, such as injunctions, may
result from violations of the proposals, but not fines or jail sentences. The police power
will be attached in the future when the City feels it has enough data to satisfy the rea-
sonableness standards that accompany the police power. In other words, the City must
be able to show that its actions are both necessary and reasonable to overcome the fifth
amendment property rights of the developing landowner who is forced to comply with
the city ordinances. Interview with David Pauling, City Attorney's Office, City of
Tulsa, in Tulsa, Oklahoma (April 10-11, 1977). See generally Annot., 85 A.L.R. 465
1933) which deals with the constitutionality of statutes related to control of surface
water.
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geological situations, typical of urban development.7 The scope of this
article will be limited, however, to jurisdictions employing the modified
common-enemy doctrine. The three geological situations are:
1. Landowner is on the lower end of a watershed and
upper development causes increased velocity or volume
of runoff.8
2. Landowner occupies a depression and subsequent devel-
opment causes standing or slow draining water. Two
distinct types, the single lot depression9 and the larger
urban depression,'0 yield different legal results.
3. Landowner is recipient of collected artificial discharge"
from another landowner.
If. BACKGROUND
Three substantive rules have been developed to determine
landowners' rights to protect themselves from surface water: the
common-enemy doctrine, the civil-law rule and the reasonable use rule.
Contrary to the deceptive labels, all three rules are products of the
American common law. 12 While some authorities believe the rules are
merging, 13 they are distinct in theory and should not be viewed as
similar means to accomplish one particular end.
7. One common problem not considered in this article is the damming back of
water or the obstruction of a man-made or natural drain. It is not covered because it
generally is typified by the tortious act itself rather than the act in conjunction with
a particular geological condition. Moreover, it involves the cessation of flow instead
of acceleration or diversion. For a general discussion of the problen, see 78 AM. JuR.
2d Waters § 130 (1975); 93 C..S. Waters § 114 (4) (1950); annot., 59 A.L.R. 2d 421,
§ 8 (1958).
8. This situation is taken from various readings cited in this comment and subse-
quently discussed with Don Flasch, hydrologist for the United States Army Corps of




12. See notes 15-27 infra and accompanying text. The English common law offers
similarities to both the common-enemy and civil law rules and has mistakenly been in-
terpreted as precedent for each, even though the two rules were developed in American
courts. The English rule on surface water drainage didn't develop until the mid-nine-
teenth century, and followed the civil law rule. See Kinyon and McClure, Interferences
With Surface Waters, 24 M-N. L. REv. 891, 899 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Interfer-
ences With Surface Waters]. Another author believes there has never been any justifi-
cation to support the common-enemy doctrine with English common law precedent. See
Thompson, Surface Waters, 23 AM. L. Rlv. 372, 391 (1889).
13. Authors generally avoid terms as conclusive as "merger," referring instead to
trends in which the rules are becoming "less and less distinguishable" and "as presently
applied will reach substantially similar results in most cases." Note, Surface Water
Drainage in Iowa, 50 IowA L. Rav. 818, 823 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Surface Water
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The Common-Enemy Doctrine
The term "common enemy" was coined in Union v. Durkes,"4
wherein water was held to be the common enemy and universal prob-
lem of every landowner. Under the original doctrine, a landowner had
an unqualified right to fend off surface water as he deemed necessary,
without consideration of the adverse effects that such defensive
measures might have on adjoining property owners. Likewise, neigh-
boring property owners had the same right to protect themselves from
surface waters in whatever manner they deemed necessary. 15 A
Drainage in Iowa]. The inevitable source for this analysis is the previously cited
Kinyon and McClure article in which the authors observed:
With the foregoing modifications and qualifications of the civil law and
common-enemy rules in mind, it should be rather apparent that the uniform
and predictable conflict of decision which would seeem inevitable from the gen-
eral statements of the two rules is not an actuality, and that in many types
of situations, though by no means in all, the actual decisions under both rules
are harmonious.
Interferences With Surface Waters, supra note 12, at 934 (emphasis added). They con-
clude that the rules are not coinciding, but that states seem to be evolving into the rea-
sonable use rule:
The Minnesota cases, of which there have been many, present a striking picture
of the complete cycle: first, the unqualified common enemy rule; then specific
exceptions; then the 'qualified' common enemy rule; and finally, the gradual
adoption of the reasonable use principle as the sole test. Several other states
have completed all but the last step in this cycle, and it seems only a matter
of time until many will have finished it.
id. at 935 (footnotes omitted). The "cycle" was predicted in 1940, and in 1977 the
common-enemy doctrine still enjoys wide usage, probably because it fosters a predictabil-
ity in favor of the developing landowner, avoiding the uncertainty inherent in reasonable
use standards.
Because common-enemy states haven't completed the cycle predicted by Kinyon and
McClure in 1940, critics of the rule have interpolated the prediction to mean that the
rules are becoming indistinguishable. This is also incorrect; the opposing presumptions
inherent in the common-enemy and civil law rules prevent this. See generally Dobbins,
Surface Water Drainage, 36 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 518, 525-26 (1960-1961) [herein-
after cited as Surface Water Drainage].
14. 38 NJ.L. 21 (Sup. Ct. 1875). Chief Justice Beasley borrowed the "common-
enemy" label from Lord Tenterden's opinion in Rex v. Commissioners of Sewers, 108
Eng. Rep. 1075 (1828). Lord Tenterden intended the doctrine to apply only to sea-
water. See generally Annot, 59 A.L.LR.2d 421 (1958). The application may have
been unintended, but the doctrine was enlarged to include surface waters. See 3 H.
FARNHAm, THE LAW OF WATans AND WATER RiGHTS, § 889c (1904) [hereinafter cited
as FARNHAM].
15. Gannon v. Hargadon, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 106, 87 Am. Dec. 625 (1865), intro.
duced the theory that provided a basis for the 'Union v. Durkes "common-enemy doc-
trine". Citing the maxim "cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum" ("whose is the
soil, his it is even to the skies"), the court upheld the defendant's right to fill in ruts
in a roadway, even though it caused his neighbor's land to flood. Such injuries were
held to be "damnunz absque injuria" (loss that does not give rise to a legal action).
Although the common-enemy concept of self protection from inland surface water
was developed in the United States, it has been erroneously credited to the English com-
mon law, which was imprecise and supported both the civil law rule and the common-
enemy theory at different times, See FARIAM, supra note 14, at & 889c,
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harsh and inflexible rule evolved from the legal precepts developed in
the initial "common enemy" cases; because landowners were permitted
unrestrained measures in fending off surface water, cooperation be-
tween neighbors was discouraged. The only certain way to avoid re-
ceiving runoff water from adjacent property was to occupy the highest
ground.' In urban areas, the problem was amplified. Since the prop-
erty of many urban landowners was not situated on sloping terrain, flood
damage, in many instances, was very severe, affecting the entire
premises of the urban dweller.
Courts responded to abuses arising out of the common-enemy doc-
trine by developing the modified common-enemy doctrine. 17 This
doctrine imposed a duty of reasonableness on the party who intended
to alter drainage, either intentionally, as with the construction of a cul-
vert, or unintentionally, as in the situation where drainage is inadver-
tently affected by the development of a non-drainage area such as a
parking lot. Under the present construction of the rule, a developing
landowner must act in good faith, without negligence and without un-
necessary harm to others.' Because urban development requires al-
teration of natural drainage, several courts have concluded that urban
areas are best served by the modified common-enemy doctrine; it is
now applied in the urban areas of twenty-three states and the District
of Columbia.'"
16. See Annot., 59 A.L.R. 2d 421, 424 (1958); see also, FARNHAM, supra note 14,
at 2595.
17. The modifications began almost as early as the rule itself. See Livingston v.
McDonald, 21 Iowa 160 (1866); Freudenstein v. Heine, 6 Mo. App. 287 (Ct. App.
1878). See also Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 421, 426-29 (1958) for cases employing the rule
for other states.
18. Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 421, 434 (1958).
19. Authorities differ concerning which jurisdictions adhere to a particular doctrine.
In 1972, the following jurisdictions were cited as subscribing to the common-enemy doc-
trine: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Indiana, Kan-
sas, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New
York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, Washing-
ton, West Virginia, Wisconsin. 5 CLARK, supra note 2, at 490.
Oklahoma adopted the common-enemy rule in Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Groves, 20 O1la. 101, 93 P. 755 (1908). In Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Richardson,
42 Okla. 457, 141 P. 1107 (1914), the court altered its position and embraced the modi-
fied version of the doctrine. In its decision, the court incorrectly cited Chicago, R.I.
& Pac. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 25 Okla. 760, 107 P. 662 (1910), as having modified the
common-enemy rule in Oklahoma. Actually, the Johnson decision merely noted the
states subscribing to the modified and strict versions of the rule. The court then noted
that the distinction was moot in Johnson and thus failed to expressly adopt the modified
rule. Id. at 764, 107 P. at 663.
In Interferences With Surface Waters, supra note 4, however, the authors assert that
Oklahoma appears to have based the decision in Garrett v. Haworth, 183 Okla. 569,
83 P.2d 822 (1938), on the civil law rule. Id. at 933. This inference is countered by
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The Civil-Law Rule
Based on the preservation of natural drainage, the civil-law rule
is the antithesis of the common-enemy doctrine. Employing the fiction
of easements between higher and lower elevated parcels, the doctrine
imposes a servitude on the lower estate, requiring that it receive all
surface water flowing down through it in its natural course. Mutual
burdens are imposed on the higher and lower estates; the owner of the
servient estate cannot interrupt the drainage from the dominant estate,
but the owner of the dominant estate may not enlarge the easement
or otherwise increase the burden on the lower landowner.2 0
If strictly applied, the civil-law rule would inhibit or prevent all
development of land that is likely to cause a change in natural drainage.
However, jurisdictions still under the rule have modified it to diminish
its harsh effects, 2 1 while others, recognizing the rule as ill-suited for
urban problems, have retained the natural flow theory only for rural
areas.12  Several other states have abandoned the rule entirely. -2 3
The Reasonable Use Rule
The concept of reasonableness in the modified common-enemy
doctrine was borrowed from the "reasonable use" rule. Developed in
the courts of New Hampshire2 4 and Minnesota,25 the rule permits a
the language of the decision, which holds that Oklahoma followed the rule that surface
water was considered a common enemy which each property owner could turn back or
pass on to the next landowner without liability. The court noted, however, that the rule
had been modified so that each owner could exercise such right only if he did not injure
his neighbor's property. Rather than an acknowledgment of the civil law rule, Garrett
V. Haworth seems instead to be a forerunner of King v. Cade, 205 Okla. 666, 240 P.2d
88 (1952).
In spite of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's mistake in noting the common law origin
of the doctrine, subsequent cases leave little doubt that Oklahoma now subscribes to the
common-enemy rule. See Iven v. Roder, 431 P.2d 321 (Okla. 1967); Lynn v. Rainey,
400 P.2d 805 (Okla. 1964); Gregory v. Bogdanoff, 307 P.2d 841 (Okla. 1957); Haskins
v. Felder, 270 P.2d 960 (Okla. 1954). It should further be noted that despite the popu-
larity of the common-enemy rule, the Restatement of Torts endorses the reasonable use
rule. See 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, §§ 822-831, 833 (1939). Cf. 1 RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 158 (1965).
20. Surface Water Drainage in Iowa, supra note 13, at 818-19.
21. 52 Cm. KENT L. Rv. 169 (1975).
22. Id.
23. Of the twenty-seven states that originally applied the civil-law rule, only thirteen
now apply it to urban areas: California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas. 5 CLARK,
supra note 2, at § 452.2(B).
24 Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 239, 9 Am. Rep. 276 (1870); Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg.
Co., 43 N.H. 569, 82 Am. Dec. 179 (1862).
25. Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 32 N.W.2d 286 (1948); Sheehan v. Flynn,
59 Minn. 436, 61 N.W. 462, 26 L.R.A. 632 (1894).
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landowner to improve or otherwise make reasonable use of his land
without fear of liability for resulting water damage, after a court has
ruled on the "reasonableness" of his intention. Reasonableness is de-
termined generally on the basis of certain criteria: (1) the surrounding
circumstances of the particular case involved; (2) the nature and extent
of the improvements sought to be made; (3) the extent of the inter-
ference with the natural flow of the surface waters; (4) the value of
the improvements as compared with the injury to the plaintiff; and (5)
the foreseeability of any harm.26
The reasonable use test has varied in application, 7 but basically
involves a balancing of the various interests involved. Therein lies the
distinction between this rule and the modified common-enemy doc-
trine; whereas the reasonable use rule requires that the proposed use
of the land meet court approval and that the developing landowner's
interest outweigh the damage to his neighbor, the common-enemy rule
requires only that malice and negligence be avoided, thus favoring the
the foreseeability of any resulting harm.
Have the Rules Merged?
The common-enemy and civil-law doctrines have been sub-
stantially modified by the reasonableness concept. Along with
the reasonable use rule, both doctrines now consider a landowner's
need to develop his land along with the corresponding right in adjacent
landowners to be free from excessive surface water runoff. Predict-
ably, jurisdictions using different doctrines often reach similar results
in analogous fact situations,2 creating the deceptive impression that the
three rules are merging.29
26. Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439, 446 (1870), cited in Comment, Diffused Surface
Waters in Mississippi, 46 Miss. L.J 118, 126 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Diffused Sur-
face Waters in Mississippi].
27. For variations, see Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 421, § 7 (1958); Diffused Surface Wa-
ters in Mississippi, supra note 25, at 128 n.73. The following states apply the reasonable
use rule: Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jer-
sey, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas (municipalities only, statute provides for civil
law rule in other areas), Utah, Wyoming. 5 CLARp, supra note 2, at § 453.2.
28. Jurisdictions under the differing rules generally allow some acceleration and
diversion of diffused surface waters by an upper landowner. However, in most states,
a landowner may not collect unusual amounts of surface water and discharge it onto ad-
joining land to its injury, or divert surface water onto another's land, to its injury, from
an area that did not drain in that direction naturally. 5 CLARK, supra note 2, at § 451.2
(E).
29. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
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It should be noted, however, that the three theories evolved from
opposite concepts and that sufficient distinctions remain between the
various jurisdictions to rebut any conclusion of a doctrinal merger.80
The civil-law rule, for example, favors retention of natural drainage,
but bends to permit development if the drainage burden isn't increased.
The common-enemy doctrine favors the landowner's right to develop
his property, but limits him to a reasonable use that will not cause un-
necessary damage to adjoining property. The reasonable use rule is
designed to balance the interests of the parties involved, but offers no
prior determination of what is reasonable, which is always a factual
question for judicial resolution. Although fairness and the demands of
urban development have brought about similar decisions under the
three rules, their diverse origins and the distinctions that remain in their
applications in some states refute the idea of merger. Since the
common-enemy doctrine is the most widely used, the folowing situa-
tions are discussed only in reference to those jurisdictions which apply
the common-enemy rule."1
III. THREE COMMON GEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN
URBAN DRAINAGE
A. INCREASED GENERAL RUNOFF
Increased surface water discharge is a natural result of urbaniza-
tion. Urban development causes an increase in surface water dis-
charge in a number of ways, such as by paving or otherwise covering per-
meable soil, or by filling in natural drainage courses, such as creeks and
gullies. As a result, adjacent and lower lands receive the additional
discharge volume, frequently at an increased velocity, since the greater
mass of water flows over an impermeable surface. Because the devel-
oper or upper landowner may have redefined the contours of the land,
water may be discharged onto bordering property at new points,
washing away topsoil and creating gullies. 32
30. For an example of diverse decisions between civil-law and common-enemy juris-
dictions, see note 44 infra. See also Surface Water Drainage, supra note 13, at 525.
31. This article cites diverse common-enemy jurisdictions to provide a broad cover-
age of the urban United States. Recent cases are generally used in place of older deci-
sions to reflect newer trends, but many nineteenth-century cases, both urban and rural,
are still controlling precedent. An attempt to provide Oklahoma illustrations is limited
by the small number of urban cases on record. Some footnotes contained herein illus-
trate problems that were not litigated, either for lack of legal remedies, out of court set-
tlement, or failure to initiate court action; they nonetheless serve as examples of urban
problems in Oklahoma.
32. A problem illustrative of the first hypothetical situation exists in the 71st and
582 [Vol. 12:574
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Generally, there is no legal recourse against a mere increase in
surface water runoff. The upper landowner may augment the flow of
water to lower lands either by increasing the volume or by changing
the mode of flow. 33  He must be acting in reasonable use of his land,
without negligence, however, and the additional discharge must not be
through a drain or artificial channel onto adjacent property. 34  Thus,
in Bennett v. Cupina,35 improvements which caused the flow of water
to be reversed down a driveway and onto plaintiff's land were held not
actionable. The court observed that although the driveway formed an
outlet, it was not an artificial conduit. Similarly, a Pennsylvania court
held that a lower landowner had no actionable claim where the defend-
ant purposefully diverted the flow of water on his own property, find-
ing that the defendant's use was reasonable and that the surface waters
entered plaintiff's land at the same point that they had for years, even
though there was an increase in volume.3"
Several courts have recognized the right to improve land for
Sheridan area of Tulsa, Oklahoma. The Hardesty Company is currently developing the
northeast corner of 71st and Sheridan for a large shopping center. Area homeowners
are concerned that the additional runoff will tax an already overburdened drainage sys-
tem beyond its capacity. The Southeast Tulsa Homeowners Assoc. (S.E.T.H.A.) sought
a writ of mandamus in Tulsa County Court to compel Hardesty to either comply with
municipal drainage requirements or stop work on the project. S.E.T.H.A. alleges that
although the architects' plans for the project were in compliance with municipal ordi-
nances, they were not followed in the construction phase. See S.E.T.H.A. v. Tulsa City
Commissioners, C76 1613 (Filed in Tulsa County Dist. Ct., Oct. 6, 1976). The writ
was denied when the City of Tulsa testified that it had no power to enforce the drainage
criteria since the subdivision plat was approved in 1965, and the drainage criteria re-
ferred to by S.E.T.H.A. was not adopted until 1976. Any future court action by the
homeowners must await the development of actual property damages in spite of profes-
sional opinions that such damage is certain to occur. Interview with Mrs. Sharon Seals,
member, S.E.T.H.A., in Tulsa, Oklahoma (April 4, 1977).
The homeowners in Valley Brook, Oklahoma, a suburb of Oklahoma City, were
more successful in pursuing an action similar to that proposed by S.E.T.H.A. In the
construction of the Crossroads Shopping Center, thirteen acres which previously drained
away from the plaintiffs were regraded and paved for parking, causing drainage to then
flow toward Valley Brook. The community's drainage system was unable to accomodate
the increased runoff and flooding resulted. The homeowners filed suit; however, the
matter was settled out of court for $60,000-the estimated cost of enlarging Valley
Brook's drainage system. See Town of Valley Brook v. Corland Corp., CJ75-28 (Filed
in Okla. County Dist. Ct., January, 1975). Interview with Edwin Shapard, attorney for
Valley Brook, in Oklahoma City (April 6, 1977).
33. Haferkamp v. City of Rock Hill, 316 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1958).
34. See notes 50-55 infra and accompanying text.
35. 253 N.Y. 436, 171 N.E. 698 (1930).
36. Leiper v. Heywood-Hall Construction Co., 381 Pa. 317, 113 A.2d 148 (1955).
See also Kuklinska v. Maplewood Homes, Inc., 146 N.E.2d 523 (Mass. 1957); Drive-




reasonable uses, even though the lower land suffers an additional drain-
age burden, as long as the resultant drainage is held to a minimum.
One case held that in the absence of an unreasonable or negligent act
by the upper landowner in the improvement of his land, the lower land-
owner had no cause of action, in spite of an increase in runoff and re-
sultant incidental damages.37 A New Jersey court stated that if an
upper landowner could improve his land by changing the volume of
surface drainage without causing lower landowners substantial damage,
he could do so, and the lower landowners had no right to complain un-
less they could show material injury. 8
In the leading case of Chamberlin v. Ciaffroni,8 9 the court held
that a higher landowner was not liable for damages to lower land
caused by water which naturally flowed from one level to another.
Moreover, the court ruled that the defendant could improve his land
by regrading or building upon it without legal responsibility for any
consequent diversion of surface waters to lands of adjoining owners,
since changes or alterations in the surface may be essential to the en-
joyment of urban property.
Courts in common-enemy jurisdictions have consistently endorsed
reasonable development of urban land, even to the detriment of neigh-
boring landowners in some cases. The underlying philosophy for
burdening adjoining lots is illustrated in Bowers v. Price,40 where the
court ruled that owners of urban lots buy and own land with the mani-
fest condition that the natural or existing surface is subject to change
by the progress of municipal development. All urban owners have
equal rights, neither lessened nor increased by priority of improvement.
The primary right of each owner is to protect his lot from loss or in-
convenience due to the flow of surface water and to the extent that
he acts upon his right to protect enjoyment of his own property, any
incidental loss to his neighbor is damnum absque injuria-an injury
for which there is no cause of action at law.
The fact that mass home building and urbanization may be con-
sidered socially beneficial, however, does not suggest that the cost of
surface water drainage should be borne in every case by adjacent land-
owners instead of by those who profit from the development. Follow-
ing this line of reasoning, a New Jersey court called for a balancing
37. Ratcliffe v. Indian Hill Acres, 93 Ohio App. 231, 113 N.E.2d 30 (1952).
38. Hughes v. Knight, 33 N.J. Super. 519, 111 A.2d 69 (1955).
39. 373 Pa. 430, 96 A.2d 140 (1953).
40. 56 Pa. D. & C. 256 (1945).
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of interests test to replace the common-enemy doctrine and its practice
of predetermination.' With that decision, New Jersey, the state that
coined the term "common-enemy," switched its allegiance to the
reasonable use rule. This case may provide precedent which will
further thin the ranks of common-enemy jurisdictions, thereby leading
to an abandonment of the presumption favoring a landowner's right to
develop his land.42
A preferrable alternative to this movement is retention of the
common-enemy rule and its pro-development posture, accompanied by
increased judicial and political awareness of the special problems of
urban areas.43  This would assure the landowner's right to use and en-
joy his land, but also insures his awareness of his duty to neighboring
landowners and, in the case of the commercial developer, his duty to
those who purchase from him.
B. THE DEPRESSION
Larger natural depressions, including moist lowlands, swamps and
marshes, are readily foreseeable as areas of drainage difficulty for land-
owners. More common and less noticeable are the smaller depressions
which may occupy a single urban lot, or larger depressions created by
the recontouring of land during urban development. This section of
41. Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956).
42. See Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 421, § 4 (1958).
43. Special problems of urban areas include:
1. Drainage is altered as a result of urbanization. See note 4 supra and
accompanying text.
2. Roofs, paved areas, and other urban structures decrease the amount of
. permeable land available to retain surface water. id.
3. Urban landowners occupy smaller lots than their rural counterparts,
thereby having fewer available options in combating the increased sur-
face water runoff. Options available to the rural resident include
diversion of runoff from adjacent land to a suitable area, such as a
pond or watercourse, or relocating whatever is threatened. The urban
resident, on the other hand, may not have the space necessary to divert
the runoff, and may not have access to a convenient watercourse. He
has little chance of relocating the damaged property on his small ur-
ban lot. If the foundation of his house is threatened by adjacent run-
off because of its location on the slope, he may have no choice except
to move. Although large rural buildings are not easily relocated, the
rural owner at least has more choice than the urbanite in determining
the building's initial location.
4. The urban dweller has lost his geological awareness. He usually pur-
chases from a builder or real estate developer, and doesn't consider
the geological surroundingg in relation to his house. Even where the
homeowner does have a choice in locating his home, he probably does
not consider its location in terms of surface water problems.
5. City governments sometimes refuse to take responsibility for planning,




the article will focus on the enclosed urban depression, noting the geo-
logical and legal distinctions between the single-lot depression and the
larger man-made urban depression.
The Single-Lot Depression
The single-lot, or backyard depression, is quite common and may
occur naturally or from adjacent development, such as by a neighbor
filling in his land to alleviate his drainage problem with the resulting
creation of an artificial depression on neighboring lands. Whatever the
origin, the resulting problem is standing water and moist, spongy soil
for several days after each rain.
Modified common-enemy jurisdictions generally uphold the right
of either an upper or lower proprietor to raise the surface of his land
without incurring legal liability.44 The use and enjoyment of urban
property is often dependent upon the power to fill existing depressions
or to otherwise improve the land surface for construction purposes. A
party damaged by the elevation of neighboring property is expected to
take similar measures to protect his property, despite the fact that no
problem existed prior to the adjacent improvement. A developing
landowner is restricted, however, to acting in good faith, without negli-
gence, in improving his land. A cause of action arises where the plain-
tiff can establish that the defendant's acts were wanton, unnecessary,
or careless.45
The Larger Depression
The larger depression is typically man-made, occurring where
large scale development diverts or eliminates natural drainage.40  It
44. Kossoff v. Rathgeb-Walsh, Inc., 3 N.Y.2d 583, 148 N.E.2d 132, 170 N.Y.S.2d
789 (1958). Mason v. Lamb, 189 Va. 348, 53 S.F_.2d 7 (1949). The civil-law rule,
in calling for natural drainage, has frequently been interpreted to hold that a landowner
may not refuse to receive adjacent runoff by filling his own land. This has caused sev-
eral civil-law jurisdictions to apply the common-enemy doctrine in cases involving the
elevation of land in urban areas. See 78 AM. Jtr. 2d Waters § 133 (1975).
45. Mason v. Lamb, 189 Va. 348, 53 S.E.2d 7 (1949).
46. Tulsa offers an excellent example of this problem. A natural depression exists
approximately one block east of South Yale Avenue, running from 24th Street to 30th
Street, where the Broken Arrow Expressway blocks off the area. The open depression
was drained by a small creek prior to residential use of the area. Developers graded
the land and eliminated the creek when houses were built, but the depression remained
open until the Broken Arrow Expressway roadbed closed the south end of the area, the
former drainage outlet. Drainage is now insufficient and rainfall results in soggy
ground; heavier storms leave standing water for several days. On May 30, 1976, a
heavy rainfall caused the sanitary sewers to back up in the neighborhood, Thirty home-
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also may exist naturally with no significant drainage problem until ad-
jacent development causes additional runoff into the area. Express-
ways, shopping centers and other large landfills may create an area with
no natural outlet, so that rainfall exceeding drainage capacity will cause
flooding. As a result, residents in such areas will have marshy soil,
despite the adequacy of street drainage, unless their lots are sloped
toward a large artificial drain.
Problems created by large urban depressions have not been fre-
quently litigated, primarily because the large depressions have been
judicially analogized to the single lot depression or the increased gen-
eral runoff situation both of which require the injured party to exercise
self-help if the developing landowner is neither careless nor negli-
gent.4 7
Unfortunately, self-help is not an adequate remedy in the larger
depression situation. While the occupant of the smaller single lot de-
pression may simply fill in his land, a similar solution would require
occupants of the larger depression to raise the level of the land several
feet, often burying structures in the middle of the depression. Nor
should the problem be viewed as the same as that of increased general
runoff; since large depressions are enclosed, no outlet exists for diver-
sion of the augmented flow.
Even in the absence of case precedent, the common-enemy theory
should allow recovery for residents of the larger depression where
nearby development unreasonably increases the drainage burden. The
special nature of the problem, as outlined above, should be clearly pre-
sented to the court, stressing the fact that the plaintiff has no realistic
self-help remedies and therefore is vulnerable to the adverse effects
of surrounding development.
Where the large urban depression is man-made, rather than
natural, a landowner should have a better chance of successfully obtain-
ing a legal remedy. Several logical steps should be followed when
seeking legal relief. First, the act that created the depression must be
determined. Developers may have filled creeks or regraded the land,
or a governmental body may have built a roadbed, thereby enclosing
a previously open depression. Relief in damages or a judicial order
owners formed the Darlington Park Homeowners Association, and filed a complaint with
the Tulsa City Commission on July 12, 1976. The city has taken no positive action
as of April 19, 1977. Interview with Manly Johnson, Chairman, Darlington Park
Homeowners Association in Tulsa, Oklahoma (October 17, 1976).
47. See notes 40 and 44 supra and accompanying text.
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requiring adequate drainage may be available if the plaintiff can show
the acts complained of constitute an unreasonable use of the land,
negligence or bad faith. 48  If the large depression is not man-made,
the damaged party may still have a remedy if he can demonstrate that
the developer should have anticipated that drainage problems would
occur after the area had been urbanized. The plaintiff must establish
that the problem results from a negligent failure to provide sufficient
drainage for normal rainfall or that the developer has failed to account
for runoff from higher ground.
Aside from a cause of action based upon a negligence theory, an
additional remedy may exist in situations where the damage suffered
by the homeowner is due to the actions of the developer from whom
the plaintiff purchased his property, as opposed to the developer of
neighboring property. In an action against a developer with whom the
homeowner has contractual privity, the plaintiff may sue, in appropriate
situations, on the express warranties in the sales or construction con-
tract, or on an implied warranty of habitability and fitness, 49 as well as
on the standard negligence or nuisance complaints.
C. ARTIFICIALLY COLLECTED DISCHARGE
The importance of the "common-enemy doctrine" and its modi-
fications is that the landowner himself determines the best means of
protecting his estate from possible water damage. As discussed pre-
viously, the landowner may fill, grade, pave and build on his property,
bound only by a standard of reasonableness and be secure from liability
for incidental damage to nearby property. Therefore, the common-
enemy doctrine is essentially a mandate for urban development, with
one crucial distinction; an upper landowner ordinarily has no right to
artificially collect surface water and discharge it in mass upon a lower
proprietor to the latter's damage.
This principle is applicable to a variety of situations. Where the
48. Lambert v. Alcorn, 144 Ill. 313, 33 N.E. 53 (1893).
49. In Oklahoma City, Quail Creek resident Anthony Zahn filed an action against
the developer for breach of an implied warranty of hability and fitness for the use in-
tended. The plaintiff alleged that the developer provided inadequate drainage, and
graded the area in such a way that surface water could not drain. The case was origin-
ally set for trial in February, 1977, but was subsequently postponed. It has been re-
set for May, 1977. See Zahn v. Land Co., CJ 74 3709 (filed in Okla. County Dist.
Ct., Oct. 17, 1974). Interview with Anthony Zahn in Oklahoma City (April 6, 1977).
See also Comment, Developments In Actions For Breach of Implied Warranties of Hab-
itability in the Sale of New Houses, 10 Tuisi. LJ. 445 (1975).
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upper landowner creates an actual channel by laying drainage tile or
pipe, or by digging a ditch, and causes water to discharge onto lower
land, an actionable wrong arises without requiring a showing that the
channel was constructed or maintained in a defective, unsafe, danger-
ous or obstructive manner.5" In the absence of an actual channel,
courts have nonetheless found artificial discharges arising from the
drainage systems constructed for parking lots, 51 an apartment com-
plex, 2 a hotel,5 a housing addition54 and a municipality. 5
IV. GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY
In General
As noted in the introduction, this comment is intended to provide
only a survey of urban surface water drainage under the common-
enemy doctrine. Government liability within state jurisdictions is
especially difficult to generalize; the frequency of impleading the pub-
lic sector, however, necessitates some coverage of the subject.5
Basically, municipal corporations have no obligation to provide for
50. Lytwyn v. Town of Wawarsing, 43 App. Div. 2d 618, 349 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1973).
But see Watters v. National Drive In, 226 Wis. 432, 63 N.W.2d 708 (1954) where the
court, in holding for the defendant, said that the installation of drainage tiles did not
conclusively establish that water had been artificially collected. Also note the import-
ance of proper pleading. Where the plaintiff alleged the defendant's change of grade
in his property caused a collection of surface water and subsequent overflow onto her
land, the complaint was dismissed for failure to allege that the water was collected or
directed by means of ditches, drains, or channels. Tench v. Highfield Estates, 2 App.
Div. 2d 991, 157 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1956).
51. Groff v. Circle K Corp., 86 N.M. 531, 525 P.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1974).
52. Abrams v. Wright, 202 S.E.2d 859 (S.C. 1974).
53. Allied Hotels, Ltd. v. Barden, 389 P.2d 968 (Okla. 1964).
54. Tidewater Oil Sales Corp. v. Shimelman, 158 A. 229 (Conn. 1932).
55. Oklahoma City v. Bethel, 175 Okl. 193, 51 P.2d 313 (1935).
56. This section discusses the government as an actual tortfeasor, but not as an in-
surer against "Act of God" storms (unpredictable storms of unusual severity), or the pri-
vate developer's misfeasance. Damaged homeowners and other interested parties have
frequently requested municipal compensation where homes were purchased in an area
with subsequent flooding problems, under the impression that the city acted as guarantor
in zoning the area for residential use. The parties are further angered when the city
appears to "pass the buck" by seemingly invoking immunity or otherwise avoiding the
would-be plaintiff(s). The truth is that immunity has not been invoked, zoning is not
a geological guarantee, and there is no cause of action against the city. Residential zon-
ing generally includes criteria to insure health and property values by restricting residen-
tial areas to residential use, and building codes may further insure health and safety by
requiring adequate drainage and sewage disposal systems. But if zoning does not include
geological criteria, perhaps it should. City planning boards could include natural drain-
age needs in the zoning equation, and the damaged homeowners would have a remedy
if they could establish in court that the area was not zoned in accordance with available
data. See Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 1135 (1954), for a discussion of enforcement of zoning
ordinances,
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drainage of surface water, nor is there any liability for the non-exercise
of governmental power to construct drains preventing the flow of sur-
face water onto adjacent properties. 57  When constructing, grading or
otherwise improving a street or highway, a municipality is not obliged
to protect adjoining property from the natural flow of surface water by
the construction of sewers, drains, or other devices.5 s
However, where a city does undertake the construction of drain-
age outlets, it is generally liable for damage to adjacent lands caused
by an unusual accumulation of water or by an artificial collection and
discharge.5 9 A municipality is liable for work negligently done,60 and
may also incur liability under a nuisance theory."' The extreme posi-
tion is that a city government is liable if it actively injures private prop-
erty by surface water, even if the damage is the necessary result of
work carefully performed and within the scope of municipal func-
tions."2
Another approach to governmental liability for surface water
damage is eminent domain. Several cases have held that compensation
is required for damages to land arising from the diversion, obstruction
or other interference with the flow of surface water.63  The theory
underlying this type of liability is that although the land is not directly
taken, damage must be compensated where the owner's use and enjoy-
ment is sufficiently interfered with so as to constitute a taking within
the meaning of the fifth amendment. 64
57. Fair v. City of Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 309 (1879); Carr v. The Northern Liberties,
35 Pa. 324 (1860); see also 57 AM. JuR. 2d Municipal, Etc., Tort Liability § 238
(1971).
58. Salzman v. New Haven, 81 Conn. 389, 71 A. 500 (1908); see also 39 AM. JUR.
2d Highways, Streets, and Bridges § 114 (1968).
59. See 57 AM. JuR. 2d Municipal, Etc., Tort Liability § 114 nn. 14, 15 (1971).
60. Smith v. Village of Victor, 134 Misc. Rep. 888, 236 N.Y.S. 566 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
See also 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 873 n.68 (1950); 39 AM. JuR. 2d High-
ways, Streets, and Bridges § 114 n.9 (1968).
61. See also 63 CJ.S. Municipal Corporations § 880 (1950).
62. Tearney v. Smith, 86 111. 391 (1877). See also 57 AM. JUR. 2d Municipal, Etc.,
Tort Liability § 239 n.20 (1971).
63. See Avondale v. McFarland, 101 Ala. 381, 13 So. 504 (1893); Woodbury v.
Beverly, 153 Mass. 245, 26 N.E. 851 (1891); In re: Chatham Street, 191 Pa. 604, 43
A. 365 (1899); Ulery v. Kitsap County, 188 Wash. 519, 63 P.2d 352 (1936).
64. The fifth amendment states, in pertinent part: "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." This guarantee insures that private
parties will not have to bear alone the entire loss where land is taken for public use,
See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). Prior to the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment, only the federal government was subject to the just compensation
clause of the fifth amendment. Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920). By 1897 the




The selection and implementation of public works are viewed as
discretionary or governmental acts, rendering a city immune from con-
sequential damages. 6  The construction and maintenance of public
systems are ministerial and liability may result under theories of negli-
gence, nuisance, or trespass. 66 However, an argument has been made
that the provision of sewers and drainage systems is beneficial to public
health, safety and sanitation and is, therefore, a protected governmental
function.67
It is doubtful that immunity could be successfully invoked where
the damage results from the construction of government property, such
as office buildings for city, state and federal governments. Although
no pertinent surface water drainage cases were found, it is well settled
that the government, as landowner, acts in a strictly proprietary
capacity.18
V. CONCLUSION
If an urban drainage problem can be placed in one of the above
categories, the potential litigant should have a good idea of his reme-
dies69 or liabilities. The artificially collected discharge generally in-
volves negligence and a lack of good faith. Where a valid cause of
action exists, ordinarily, the available remedies are injunctive relief,
damages or both. There is no established legal precedent to suggest
the precise remedies available in the larger urban depression hy-
pothesis. However, logically, suitable relief should exist if the plaintiff
can prove that drainage has been altered and can identify the negligent
party.
On the other hand, the single lot depression and the increased
property owners the same protection against the states as the fifth amendment did
against the federal government. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S.
226 (1897).
65. 63 CJ.S. Municipal Corporations § 873 nn. 72 & 73 (1950).
66. Id. at 253 n.80.
67. Id. at 253 n.75.
68. This statement refers to property which a governmental entity owns or leases
for proprietary purposes. See generally 63 CJ.S. Municipal Corporations § 896 (1950).
69. In addition to the judicial and self-help remedies discussed in this comment, the
damaged landowner should consider political action. One example is the planning ini-
tiative taken by the West of Main Improvement Association. See note 5 infra. Other
possibilities include lobbying both city and state governments and participating in any
open meetings or hearings held locally. This may be done individually or with a home-
owners group, such as those mentioned in notes 5, 32 and 46 supra.
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general runoff problems usually present situations where no cause of
action will lie unless the damaged party can make a special showing
of lack of care, excessive damage or malice, or can demonstrate a more
adequate drainage system is feasible. The reason for this is that these
problems arise from normal urban growth, and a landowner should be
able to improve his land without assuming liability for all the natural
results of the improvement. Urban dwellers must accept the fact that
the features of urbanization-paved streets, parking areas, drainage
and sewer systems, roofs, sidewalks, and playgrounds-produce some
inconveniences along with the benefits they provide. One of these in-
conveniences is excess surface water runoff; like traffic congestion and
steadily rising property taxes, it is part of the urban environment.
James P. George
